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 1 Introduction
In the last two decades, many countries have launched extensive privatization
programs. There is now a growing body of literature on the eﬀects of privati-
zation on productive eﬃciency. We contribute to this literature in three ways.
First, we present a complete picture of privatization as we analyze the eﬀects of
privatization on both productive and allocative (market) eﬃciency using data
from the Turkish cement industry. Second, our analysis goes beyond examining
the privatization eﬀects and explores how privatization really works. Is it the
changing objectives due to private ownership or a change in the competitive en-
vironment that causes possible eﬃciency gains? By focusing on this question we
aim to provide insights to researchers and policymakers in their analysis/design
of other privatization experiments. Third, our data set enables us to avoid the
endogeneity problem associated with sample selection. All public cement plants
in Turkey have been privatized and we have pre and post privatization data for
all.
Privatization eﬀorts in Turkey, fueled by the forces of globalization, started
in 1985. The given motivations for privatization were to relieve the state of
the burdens of ineﬃcient state industries, improve eﬃciency and create revenue
for the government. Although the privatization process in Turkey has started
earlier than in most developing countries, its progress–measured in terms of the
size of divestiture–has been slower compared with the principal Latin American
and Eastern European cases (Ercan and Onis, 2001). Since its start in 1985,
the total proceeds from privatization eﬀorts have amounted to $9.4 billion by
2005.
Turkey is the largest cement producer in Europe and seventh in the world. It
is also the second largest exporter of cement (OAIB, Cimento Sektoru Raporu,
1988, 2002). Privatization of the cement industry provides an excellent ground
1to test competing theories on public ownership since due to high transportation
costs, this industry has some elements of a natural (regional) monopoly. Ac-
cording to one view point, public ownership is considered to be one of the main
solutions to the problems of market failure that arise in this type of market
structure. The economic theory of privatization is a subset of the vast body
of literature concerning the economics of ownership and the role for govern-
ment ownership of productive resources. There are two main branches in this
literature: The Social View (Shapiro and Willig, 1990) and the Agency View
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In this paper we identify
the predictions of existing models of ownership and empirically test the validity
of these predictions.
Our results show that privatization increases labor productivity and de-
creases prices signiﬁcantly indicating an improvement in both productive and
allocative eﬃciency. Our results on productive eﬃciency are robust to con-
trolling for changes in the competitive environment (market structure), while
privatization no longer has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on prices in the presence of this
control. We ﬁnd evidence that a ﬁrm’s technology becomes more capital inten-
sive as both the capital endowment, investment and capital labor ratios increase
following privatization.
These results are not biased due to sample selection problems since all public
cement plants in Turkey were privatized and we have pre and post privatization
data for all. Due to data limitations, the empirical literature on privatization
typically presents studies of partial privatization experiments in which some of
the ﬁrms in the analysis are privatized while others remain public. Hence, it is
arguable that ﬁrms selected for privatization might have unobserved character-
istics that could have aﬀected results.
Most existing empiricial studies on privatization either compare private and
public ﬁrms at the same point in time or are gathered from studies of privati-
2zation of the before-after variety which examine the averages of key variables
before and after privatization and test for signiﬁcant changes. Cross-sectional
studies may have diﬃculty in controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects, while before-
after studies may fail to control for period-speciﬁce ﬀects. We contribute to
this literature by fully controlling for ﬁrm and time speciﬁce ﬀects using a ﬁxed
eﬀect panel data estimator.
In the next section we review the theoretical and empirical literature on pri-
vatization. Section 3 describes the privatization environment and the cement
industry in Turkey. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents the econo-
metric framework. Section 6 presents and discusses the results, while Section 7
concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Theoretical Literature on Privatization
The economic theory of privatization is a subset of the vast body of literature
examining the economics of ownership and the role of government ownership
of productive resources. There are two main branches in this literature: The
Social View and the Agency View.
According to the Social View (Shapiro and Willig, 1990), state owned en-
terprises are capable of curing market failures by implementing pricing policies
that take account of social marginal costs and beneﬁts of production. A pri-
vately owned ﬁrm is expected to maximize proﬁts whereas a state owned ﬁrm
is expected to maximize social welfare. For example, in a natural monopoly
market structure, eﬃciency calls for a single ﬁrm to exist. A proﬁt maximizing
monopoly will, however, charge too high a price and produce too low a quantity.
This potential ineﬃciency can be solved by state ownership.
The Agency View of ﬁrm ownership presents a strong critique of this theory.
3There are two complementary strands of the literature which diﬀer as to whether
the agency conﬂict is with the manager or the politician. Vickers and Yarrow
(1988) argue that managers of state owned enterprises (SOEs) may lack high-
powered incentives or proper monitoring. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) stress that
political interference in the ﬁrm results in excessive employment, poor choices of
product and location, lack of investments and ill-deﬁned incentives for managers.
The Social View unequivocally predicts that eﬃcient technology will be cho-
sen by state owned ﬁrms. Models of Agency View, on the other hand; while
predicting that ineﬃcient technologies will be chosen by politicians/managers;
have diﬀerent predictions for the direction of the distortion in the production
process. They either predict that state owned ﬁrms will have low investment
levels (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), or that they will use excess capital as well
as excess labor (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). The over-capitalization argument
stems from bureaucratic ineﬃciency models. The founder of this line of litera-
ture, Niskanen (1975), proposed that bureaucrats are inclined to maximize their
total budget rather than the utility of their sponsors. Vickers and Yarrow (1988)
argue that the bureaucrats will subject the state owned ﬁrm to over-investment
and over-capitalization to justify high salaries and perks.
On allocative eﬃciency, the Social View predicts that prices are likely to
rise as a result of privatization. The Agency View on the other hand, predicts
that if a reasonable degree of competition ensues then allocative eﬃciency may
actually increase as ﬁrms increase their productivity after privatization. In this
paper we test the models of the Social View and of the Agency View by empir-
ically examining whether privatization improves allocative eﬃciency and ﬁrm
productivity. We further diﬀerentiate between the two models of the Agency
View by examining how privatization aﬀects a ﬁrm’s capital endowment.
42.2 Empirical Literature on Privatization
Privatization and Productive Eﬃciency
Firm performance has been the focus of the empirical literature on privatiza-
tion. Studies cited in a survey of empirical studies of privatization almost unani-
mously report increases in ﬁrm performance associated with privatization (Meg-
ginson and Netter, 2001).1 Most of these studies compare post-privatization
performance changes with either a comparison group of non-privatized ﬁrms or
compare three year mean/median performance of privatized ﬁrms to their own
mean/median performance during their last three years as state owned ﬁrms.
Critics of these ﬁndings are quick to point out that all of the gains researchers
have documented after privatization are due to selection bias. The argument
is that better ﬁrms are privatized ﬁrst and their comparison to more poorly
performing ﬁrms that happen to remain public gives a spurious relationship
between privatization and ﬁrm performance. Cross-sectional studies may not
be able to satisfactorily control for ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects and therefore address
the selection problem for privatization. While comparing before and after three
year averages of performance measures might be less biased, even that method
may not entirely solve the selection problem. One could argue that, those ﬁrms
would have improved at any rate even if they were not privatized or other re-
forms that accompany the privatization process may have been responsible for
the changes observed (Omran, 2004). When Omran compares before and after
privatization averages of performance measures of privatized ﬁrms from Egypt,
he ﬁnds a signiﬁcant increase in performance. But when he carries out the same
exercise for ﬁrms that remain state-owned he ﬁnds that they also improve after
the privatization period though they themselves are not privatized. Either the
1As u r v e yb yD j a n k o va n dM u r r e l l( 2 0 0 2 )e x a m i n e st h ee ﬀects of privatization in transition
economies. They conclude that in most countries, privately owned ﬁrms perform better than
state owned ﬁrms.
5improvement of privatized ﬁrms has spillover eﬀects on state-owned ﬁrms or
privatization has nothing to do with the changes observed. The author sug-
gests that other economic reforms that enhanced the competitive environment
in which his sample of privatized and state-owned ﬁrms were operating might
have been responsible for his ﬁndings.
Some recent studies control for unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity using ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects in a panel data analysis (Earle and Telegdy, 2002; Ehrlich et al.,
1994; Frydman et al., 1999; Villalonga, 2000; Wallsten, 2001). The results
of these studies on privatization and ﬁrm performance are mixed. Ehrlich et
al. (1994) use a sample of twenty-three comparable international airlines of
diﬀerent ownership categories over the period 1973-83. Their results suggest
that private ownership leads to higher rates of productivity growth and declining
costs in the long run, and that these diﬀerences are not aﬀected by the regulatory
environment. Their estimates suggest that the short-run eﬀects of changes from
state to private ownership on productivity and costs are ambiguous.
Villalonga (2000) examines twenty-four Spanish ﬁrms from diﬀerent indus-
tries and ﬁnds that privatization does not increase ﬁrm eﬃciency (deﬁned as
rate of return on assets. He argues that political factors such as the business
cycle during which the ﬁrm is privatized and foreign ownership are important
determinants of ﬁrm eﬃciency). Wallsten (2001) ﬁnds that in the telecom-
munications sector, privatization by itself does not appear to generate many
beneﬁts and is negatively correlated with main line penetration. He points out
the importance of regulatory framework ensuing from privatization as he ﬁnds
that privatization combined with the existence of a separate regulator is cor-
related with increased connection capacity and labor eﬃciency as measured by
employees per main line.
Earle and Telegdy (2002) ﬁnd that privatization increases labor productiv-
ity growth in their heterogeneous sample of Romanian ﬁrms. Frydman et al.
6(1999), ﬁnd that privatization to outsider owners has signiﬁcant eﬀects on rev-
enue performance, but not on cost reduction using data from the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary and Poland, of 218 state owned ﬁrms, of which 128 were privatized
during the period from 1990 to1994.
We contribute to this literature by controlling for ﬁrm and time ﬁxed eﬀects
in our baseline regressions.
Privatization and Allocative Eﬃciency
Studies that examine the eﬀect of privatization on allocative eﬃciency are
rare (Megginson and Netter, 2001). These studies typically ﬁnd that prices
either increase or do not change after privatization. La Porta and Lopez-De-
Silanes (1999) analyze Mexican ﬁrms from a variety of industries and ﬁnd that
consumer prices increase after privatization. In their analysis of the water and
sewerage industry of England and Wales, Saal and Parker (2001) ﬁnd that out-
put prices increase, and furthermore, total price performance indices reveal that
increases in output prices have outstripped increases in input costs. On the other
hand, in a cross-country panel study of the telecommunications sector, Wallsten
(2001) ﬁnds that prices are not correlated with privatization but are negatively
correlated with competition; measured by the number of mobile operators not
owned by the incumbent.
It is unrealistic to expect that the eﬀects of privatization on prices will be the
same in every industry. Market structure of an industry (market power of ﬁrms
in the industry) as well as ﬁrms’ productivity will aﬀect consumer prices. In
our study we contribute to this literature by striving to diﬀerentiate the eﬀects
of private ownership from the changes in market structure and competitive
environment induced by privatization and other economic reforms.
Privatization and Input Choice
Empirical studies of privatization do not directly examine the changes in
input choice resulting from privatization. Rather, they report changes in em-
7ployment and capital investment, which may suggest a change in technology.
In their survey article, Megginson and Netter (2001) report that almost all of
the twenty-two studies from non-transition economies that they review ﬁnd that
capital investment spending increases signiﬁcantly as ﬁrms are privatized. Per-
haps surprisingly, they report that these studies are far less unanimous regarding
the impact of privatization on employment levels in privatized ﬁrms.
La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes (1999), in their study of 233 privatized Mex-
ican ﬁrms, ﬁnd that ratios of investment to sales and investment to ﬁxed as-
sets signiﬁcantly increase after privatization while employment signiﬁcantly de-
creases.
Bhaskar and Khan (1995) ﬁnd that privatization has a large and signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on white-collar workers using employment data from Bangladesh,
for 62 jute mills of which 31 were privatized.
In this study we contribute to this literature by analyzing how capital, in-
vestment and employment and capital labor ratios change for privatized ﬁrms
in the Turkish cement industry.
Privatization and Market Structure
Few studies have sought to estimate the eﬀects of market structure along
with privatization. These studies typically include some type of measure for
market concentration as an additional control when they measure the eﬀects
of privatization on ﬁrm productivity. In general, they do not analyze how pri-
vatization aﬀects market structure or how changes in market structure aﬀect
allocative eﬃciency. Angelucci et al. (2001) analyze the eﬀects of competitive
pressures (measured by Herﬁndahl index and share of imports in sales) and
ownership changes on productivity in Bulgaria Poland and Romania. Ander-
son, Young and Murrell (2000) analyze the eﬀects of competition and ownership
on the productivity of the newly privatized enterprises using data from Mongo-
lia. Kattuman and Domanski (1997) analyze market concentration as a result
8of mass privatization in Poland and ﬁnd that concentration rapidly increases in
several markets. Warzynski (2003) in his study of 300 Ukrainian ﬁrms ﬁnds that
competition does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm performance measured by
productivity and proﬁtability while privatization has a marginal positive signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on proﬁtability and an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on productivity. He points
out, however, that competition and privatization might be complementary mea-
sures, as he ﬁnds that competition increases the performance of privatized ﬁrms.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing how privatization may aﬀect
market concentration in an oligopolistic industry and by controlling for market
concentration in our analysis of privatization eﬀects on allocative eﬃciency as
well as on ﬁrm productivity.
3 Institutional Background
3.1 Privatization in Turkey
Historically, Turkey has a long experience of relying heavily on state owned
enterprises (SOEs). SOEs were established during the 1930s by the government
to jump-start the economy that had collapsed with the end of the Ottoman era
in 1923. Over the years SOEs grew enormously, leaving the control of a large
section of the economy to bureaucrats and politicians. Politicians exploited
SOEs to provide jobs to their constituents at the expense of consumers, who
were faced with higher prices. Consequently, in the 1980s, SOEs began to be
perceived negatively due to poor ﬁnancial performance, overstaﬃng, dependence
on subsidies, protected markets and corruption (Ertuna, 1998).
After a Military Regime (1980-1983), the ﬁrst party that came to power was
the Motherland Party (ANAP) under the leadership of Prime Minister Turgut
Ozal. Ozal was a strong supporter of Thatcherism that promoted a reduction of
the state’s role in the economy. Privatization ﬁrst entered the political agenda
9with Ozal’s trade and capital account liberalization program in 1984.
Despite this initial enthusiasm, the privatization process has been slow. From
its start in 1985 up to 2005, the total proceeds from privatization eﬀorts have
amounted to $9.4 billion. More than half of this was realized in the 2000-
2004 period after the 1999 IMF Stand By agreement, which placed a particular
emphasis on privatization. Block sales have been the most prevalent method of
privatization.
The privatization reforms have not been fully carried out as intended, due to
the lack of a legal framework, conﬂicting laws and a wavering political will. Pri-
vatization eﬀorts faced strong opposition by entrenched vested interests, notably
senior bureaucrats in government departments and SOEs, Workers’ Unions who
have expressed serious concern about the possibility of mass lay oﬀs and leftist
political parties (Karatas, 2001). Still, numerous companies have been priva-
tized. The share of the public sector in total value added manufacturing is down
from 40% in 1986 to 18.5% in 2000, which is a 54% reduction.
3.2 Privatization Process in the Cement Industry
The ﬁrst cement plant of Turkey was established in 1911 by a private ﬁrm. By
1950, four more private plants had been built. Only after 1950 did the cement
industry develop on a large scale by means of a government initiative. A public
enterprise, CISAN (Turkish acronym for Turkish Cement Industry Co. later
named CITOSAN), was established in 1953 to build ﬁf t e e np l a n t si nv a r i o u s
regions. Before the privatization of the cement plants began in 1989, the public
share in the cement industry was nearly 40 %. (Saygili and Taymaz, 2001). It is
believed that each company was able to exercise some monopoly power within
its hinterland (Ertuna, 1998), most probably due to the distance between ﬁrms
and the lack of proper transportation facilities in the public sector.
In 1986 a French company, Sema-Metra Conceil, was contracted by the
10Turkish government and the World Bank to prepare two reports, one on the
structural regulation of the cement sector and privatization and the other on
the plan for the reorganization of CITOSAN. In the latter report, Sema-Metra
Conceil suggested that plants in the west be privatized ﬁrst since they could
be as proﬁtable as private plants, and recommended that the eastern plants be
restructured prior to privatization. The report also suggested privatization on a
plant-by-plant basis, as the sale of the state ﬁrm as a single entity may have led
to an unhealthy monopoly (Tallant, 1993). In 1986 there was a major change in
the economic environment of the cement plants. Prior to 1986, the Turkish Ce-
ment Producers’ Association (TCPA) set prices and market areas for all cement
companies, however after 1986 ﬁrms were encouraged to operate independently
and maximize proﬁts. Sema-Metra’s ﬁrst report might have partially led to this
change.
Privatization in the cement industry started in 1989, with the initial sale
of ﬁve factories to the French ﬁrm Cement Francais (SCF). By 1998, the sale
of twenty-two cement plants has been completed.2 The recommendations of
the Sema-Metra report were taken into consideration, and the western plants
were privatized ﬁrst.3 It may also be the case that the privatization of the
eastern plants was delayed, as the eastern region suﬀered from unemployment
and terrorism throughout the 1990s and the public enterprises were used as
means of employment.
Privatization of the cement plants was carried out under the Privatization
Administration of Turkey. Most of the privatizations were realized through
block sales using closed-bid auctions and through a combination of block sales
and public oﬀerings in a few cases. Public sector employment was guaranteed
2Also privatized were the two cement grinding facilities. Since these were not full scale
production plants we exclude them from our estimations.
3Two exceptions were Denizli and Lalapasa. These two public plants were established in
1987 and 1991 respectively, in order to meet the growing demand in the western regions.
11to all workers that lost their jobs because of privatization. Hence there were no
disposal costs of workers for the buyers of the privatized ﬁrms. Table 1 presents
all plants that were privatized, with their establishment and privatization dates
and the names of their buyers.
Saygili and Taymaz (2001) pointed out that holding companies had a ten-
dency to acquire plants in speciﬁc regions. For instance, Rumeli Holding bought
plants in the eastern region and along the Black Sea coast. The Turkish Armed
Forces Pension Fund (OYAK) and Sabanci Holding; one of the biggest holding
companies in Turkey formed an alliance and purchased companies in Central
Anatolia, Southern Anatolia and Marmara regions. Set Cement Holding (a sub-
sidiary of Italcementi which merged with Ciment Francais) focused on Central
and Western regions, and ﬁnally, Lafarge and Yibitas own cement plants in
neighboring provinces of Central Anatolia. Saygili and Taymaz (2001) argued
that privatization through block sales, instead of public oﬀerings in the stock
market, gave rise to bigger regional monopolies. According to the report of the
Central Anatolian Board of Export, however, the privatization of public cement
plants increased competition in the industry and decreased prices.
In order to gather some anecdotal evidence, we asked the managers of the
privatized cement plants their views on the eﬀects of privatization in their sec-
tor. Six managers out of twenty-two were willing to share their views under
the condition of strict anonymity. They all indicated that their plants increased
productivity drastically as a result of privatization. Five out of the six man-
agers rated the introduction of new production methods and automation as the
most important factor in this improvement. One manager rated the changed
incentives of employees as the most important factor, while he rated automation
as a very important determinant of increased productivity. They all indicated
that their capacity and output have increased as a result of privatization and
that proﬁt margins have been falling due to ﬁerce competition and the recent
12decline in aggregate demand due to the economic crisis in 2002.
Today, the Turkish cement industry consists of thirty-nine private plants,
some owned by giant industrial holdings and others by small one-plant compa-
nies. There are four foreign investors in the industry; namely, French Lafarge
Coppee, Ciment Vicat, German Heidelberger Zement/CBR and Italian Ital-
cementi. Cement consumption continues to grow at sound levels and Turkey
continues to be a major exporter of cement. According to the report of the
Central Anatolian Board of Export, in 1998, Turkey was the largest cement
producer in Europe and seventh in the world (OAIB, Cimento Sektoru Raporu,
1998).
4D a t a
All of the Turkish publicly owned cement plants were privatized between 1989
and 1998. Since our sample includes all of these plants with their pre and post
privatization data we are able to look at a more complete picture of privatization
and avoid the problem of endogeneity associated with sample selection. The
privatization of the public cement plants in Turkey is like a natural experiment
that allows us to examine the eﬀects of privatization in an almost ideal setting.
Our data spans a period from 1983 to1999 for many of the variables of in-
terest, though the time series is shorter for some variables and the panel is
not always balanced. Our data on output, employment and investment are con-
structed from the oﬃcial statistics of the Privatization Administration of Turkey.
Our data on capital and sales are constructed from the Istanbul Chamber of In-
dustry 500 largest ﬁrms of Turkey surveys. Table 2 describes the variables used
in our analysis.
There are a few other empirical studies that analyze the impact of privati-
13zation on the Turkish cement industry (Ozmucur, 1998; Tallant, 1993; Saygili
and Taymaz, 2001). These studies focus on the eﬀects of privatization on ﬁrm
productivity and do not analyze how privatization aﬀects allocative eﬃciency,
market structure and input choice. Also, their analysis does not extend beyond
1995 and hence at least six plants are treated as public during the study period.
Interestingly, their results on ﬁrm productivity are mixed. Ozmucur (1998)
analyzes a panel of public and private cement establishments, using the results
of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s surveys on the 500 largest ﬁrms of Turkey.
He estimates a separate equation for each ﬁrm to determine the year of struc-
tural change for employment and labor productivity for the 1981-1995 period.
He ﬁnds that structural change coincided with time of privatization for public
ﬁrms and reduction in employment which to a degree happened in all ﬁrms was
signiﬁcantly higher in the privatized ﬁrms.
Tallant (1993) analyzes the relative eﬃciency of public sector with respect
to the private sector in Turkish cement industry in a cross sectional study.
He ﬁnds that private plants are more eﬃcient in terms of productivity and
capacity utilization. However, he argues that the better showing in physical
measures is closely related to geographic location as western plants perform
better which indicates that the initial location decision has had more to do with
ﬁrm performance than public ownership per se.
Saygili and Taymaz (2001) analyze the eﬀects of ownership and privatization
on technical eﬃciency using a panel data set of public and private cement plants
for the years 1980-1995 and measure the relative performance of private or
privatized ﬁrms with respect to the six plants that remain public during the
study period. In fact since they lack post-privatization data for two other plants
(Adiyaman and Askale), they have eight plants in their comparison group. They
ﬁnd that private plants were clearly more eﬃcient than the comparison group
but the average technical eﬃciency of private plants and public plants privatized
14in 1989 revealed no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
How can we reconcile the diﬀerences in results as to the eﬀects of privatiza-
tion on ﬁrm eﬃciency? One explanation can be the diﬀerences in the competitive
environments of these plants. Perhaps plants privatized in 1989 performed as
well as private plants due to a more competitive environment in the western
regions where they coexisted with private plants. In our empirical analysis we
will control for the market structure and hence the competitive environment
when we measure the eﬀects of privatization. Another explanation is perhaps
in the diﬀerences in the questions asked. Tallant, Saygili and Taymaz studies
ask how private plants compare with public ones. Whereas Ozmucur and our
study focus on how privatization aﬀects performance. Since we have post pri-
vatization data for plants privatized in the 1995-1998 period, we can test the
eﬀects of privatization on eastern plants which were privatized later as well as
western plants which were privatized earlier.
5E c o n o m e t r i c F r a m e w o r k
We evaluate the impact of privatization on ﬁrm performance by adopting the
following framework:
yit = αPit + βXit + µi + δtDt + εit (1)
where i denotes ﬁrm i and t denotes year t, yit is the outcome variable of
interest such as labor productivity, price etc., Pit is the treatment variable
(Privatization Eﬀect) equal to 1 if year t is a post privatization period for ﬁrm
i and is 0 otherwise. Xit is a vector of additional regressors that we use in some
speciﬁcations. One important regressor in Xit is the Herﬁndahl Index (HHI) of
t h er e g i o ni nw h i c ht h eﬁrm is located. The Herﬁndahl Index is obtained by
squaring the regional market-share of cement ﬁr m s ,a n dt h e ns u m m i n gt h o s e
squares. We use HHI to measure the eﬀects of privatization which operate
15through the changes in the ﬁrm’s competitive environment. This speciﬁcation
allows us to diﬀerentiate between the eﬀects of private ownership and the eﬀects
of changes in market structure due to privatization reforms. µi is the ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀect and Dt is a dummy which is equal to 1 in year t and is 0 otherwise.
Coeﬃcient α will capture the eﬀect of privatization on our outcome variable.
Equation 1 denotes our standard baseline regression.
6 Results and Discussion
Table 2 describes the variables used in our estimations. Table 3 presents the
comparison of the three year averages of the variables of interest before and
after privatization. Our results indicate that labor productivity, investment and
capital are signiﬁcantly higher, whereas prices and employment are signiﬁcantly
lower in the post privatization period. The fall in prices during this period may
be due to an increase in competition among the cement ﬁrms and/or a decrease
in marginal costs of production. In following part of this paper, we analyze the
eﬀects of privatization on productive and allocative eﬃciency using panel data
methods and hence making full use of the richness of our data set to examine
the potential factors that may have contributed to improvements in eﬃciency.
Privatization and Productive Eﬃciency
Regressions 1 and 2; presented in Table 4; show the eﬀects of privatization
on labor productivity (in logs). We have controlled for ﬁrm speciﬁca n dp e r i o d
speciﬁce ﬀects by adopting a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation and including year
dummies. We observe that privatization has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
labor productivity in Regression 1. A switch from public ownership to private
ownership increases labor productivity by 24%.4 In Regression 2, we also control
for log of the capital labor ratio in addition to the controls used in Regression 1.
4Results on economic signiﬁcance are calculated by the following formula:
exp(coefficient) − 1.
16The privatization eﬀect remains positive and signiﬁcant though the increase in
labor productivity drops from 24 to 21% when we control for the capital labor
ratio. The capital labor ratio, as expected, has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
on labor productivity though its coeﬃcient is smaller than expected. We can
interpret Regression 2 as a Cobb-Douglas production function speciﬁcation.5
Hence, we conclude that privatization has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
productive eﬃciency.
Privatization and Allocative Eﬃciency
In Table 4, Regressions 3 and 4 present the eﬀects of privatization on alloca-
tive eﬃciency. Our measures for allocative eﬃciency are ﬁrm speciﬁc cement
prices (in log) and the relative inﬂation rate. The relative inﬂation rate is calcu-
lated by subtracting the wholesale price index inﬂation rate from the ﬁrm price
inﬂation rate. We know that prior to the price de-regulation in 1986, the price
of each publicly owned plant was set to the same amount by CITOSAN, the
Public Enterprise. Unfortunately, we do not have data on these prices but we
have an industry-wide price index from the State Planning Institute of Turkey.
Hence, we calculate the ﬁrm price inﬂation rate by using this industry-wide
price index prior to 1986, and by using ﬁrm speciﬁc prices post 1986. Since this
variable merely indicates rate of change, it is possible to construct it using two
diﬀerent price indices as long as we code the year for which we switch from one
index to the next as missing. Our goal in constructing the relative inﬂation rate
is to achieve a longer series on price.
Both regressions control for ﬁrm speciﬁca n dp e r i o ds p e c i ﬁce ﬀects by adopt-
ing a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation and including year dummies. We ﬁnd that
privatization decreases both cement prices and the relative inﬂation rate. A
5Consider the Cobb-Douglas production function, Y = KβL1−β where Y is output, K is
capital and L is labor. Dividing both sides by L,w eg e tY/L=( K/L)β . T h el e f th a n ds i d eo f
this equation is labor productivity and K/L is the capital labor ratio. We take the logarithm
of both sides and esimate this equation in Regression 2 of Table 4. The coeﬃcient on the
capital labor ratio is the estimate for β.
17switch from public ownership to private ownership decreases cement prices by
32%. This ﬁnding is in sharp contrast to most of the earlier studies which
ﬁnd that privatization results in an increase in prices (La Porta and Lopez-
De-Silanes, 1999; Wales, Saal and Parker, 2001)). Hence, the link between
privatization and allocative eﬃciency needs to be more closely examined. Mar-
ket structure change resulting from privatization is the most likely candidate to
explain the diﬀerences in these results.
Privatization and Input Choice
How does a privatized ﬁrm change its production process to improve its
productive eﬃciency? To answer this question, we analyze how privatization
aﬀects a ﬁrm’s input choices. Our dependent variables in these regressions are
labor, capital, capital labor ratio and investment (all in logs). All regressions,
presented in Table 5, control for ﬁrm speciﬁc and period speciﬁce ﬀects by
adopting a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation and including year dummies. We ﬁnd
that privatization has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor (Regression
1) and a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on capital, the capital labor ratio and
investment (Regressions 2, 3 and 4, respectively). These results suggest that the
privatized ﬁrm reduces its number of workers and increases its capital. A switch
from public to private ownership decreases the number of workers employed by
the ﬁrm by 21% and increases the ﬁrm’s capital by 47%. Upon privatization
an average ﬁrm increases its investment by more than 100%. The reduction in
number of employees as ﬁrms are privatized may indicate the presence of excess
and wasteful employment practices of the public cement plants. The drastic
increase in investment and capital utilization accompanying the reduction in
labor, however, also indicate a switch to a more capital intensive technology.
We should also note that the drastic increase in capital (assets) implies that the
rate of return on assets; a variable often us e di ne m p i r i c a ls t u d i e so fp r i v a t i z a t i o n
may not be an appropriate measure of performance in the short-run.
18Privatization and Market Structure
Privatization may aﬀect productive and allocative eﬃciency in two ways.
The ﬁr s to ft h e s ei st h ep u r eo w n e r s h i pe ﬀect; a public ﬁrm may experience a
signiﬁcant change in its objective function upon privatization as discussed in
the theoretical literature section (ownership eﬀect). Second, privatization may
inﬂuence the market structure in which the ﬁrm operates and hence change
the constraints faced by the ﬁrm (environment eﬀect). In this section, we will
examine the second eﬀect more closely and determine whether we still observe
an ownership eﬀect on eﬃciency when we control for the eﬀect of privatization
on market structure.
Figure 1 and 2 present time series data for the region speciﬁcH e r ﬁndahl
index (HHI) for a western region (Marmara Region) and for an eastern region
(Eastern Anatolia Region) respectively. The time series spans the period from
1980 2000. The Herﬁndahl Index (HHI) is calculated by summing the squares
of market shares of plants in each region. If two or more plants are owned by
the same parent company, then the market share of the parent company in the
region is used in the calculation. The higher the HHI, the more concentrated
the market. HHI(1) is the total Herﬁndahl index including the publicly owned
ﬁrms and HHI(2) is the Herﬁndahl index excluding the publicly owned ﬁrms.
In other words, in calculating HHI(1) we consider the share of output sold
by publicly owned ﬁrms as the share of a single ﬁrm–the public enterprise.
In calculating HHI(2) we only consider output sold by privately owned ﬁrms
(including privatized ﬁrms) and base our measure on how this private output is
shared among the privately owned ﬁrms.
In Figure 1 and 2, vertical lines on graphs indicate years in which privati-
zations took place in that region. The graphs suggest that HHI(1) increases
in Marmara region and decreases in Eastern Anatolia Region. Furthermore,
before privatization there seems to be a relatively competitive environment in
19the Marmara region while Eastern Anatolia region did not have a single private
plant. We should note that Marmara region is the most populous region, with
the largest economy, in Turkey. Graphs for other regions are not presented but
are available upon request. These graphs indicate that HHI(1) decreases in the
Central and Southeast Anatolia regions after privatization while there does not
seem to be a signiﬁcant change in HHI(1) in the Aegean and Black Sea regions.
These striking diﬀerences in the market structures of western and eastern
regions before privatization might be partially responsible for ﬁndings of earlier
studies. Saygili and Taymaz (2001) ﬁnd that public plants located in the west
were not that diﬀerent from private ones while public plants located in the east
were performing more poorly. Similarly, Tallant (1993) in his comparison of
public plants with private ones, points out that public plants located in the east
were signiﬁcantly worse performers than private ones. Hence the competitive
environment might be important in determining ﬁrm performance. Therefore,
we should analyze the eﬀect of privatization on market structure more closely.
In order to have a more in-depth analysis of how privatization aﬀects market
structure, we present OLS regression results using the HHI(1) data. Here our
unit of analysis is a region of Turkey and our dependent variable is HHI(1)
in that region. For example in the ﬁrst regression of Table 6, our dependent
variable is HHI(1) in the Marmara region. Our explanatory variables, dummy89
and dummy96 control for the structural shifts induced by the privatizations of
1989 and 1996 in the Marmara region. Dummy89 (dummy96) is equal to 1
in the post 1989 (1996) period and 0 otherwise. Since privatization years may
diﬀer across regions, dummies used may diﬀer across regressions. In general, our
regression results seem to conﬁrm our observations in the graphs. Privatization
increases HHI in the Marmara region and decreases it in East and Southeast
Anatolia regions. Evidence is mixed for the Black Sea, Central Anatolia and
Aegean regions.
20Our ﬁrst lesson here is that even for the same industry, diﬀerent plants may
face diﬀerent competitive environments when transportation costs are impor-
tant. Another lesson is that multiple industry studies of privatization (most
empirical studies are of this kind) are likely to mask diﬀerences in market struc-
ture in which these ﬁrms operate. It is highly unlikely that privatization will
h a v et h es a m ee ﬀect on market structure in every industry. To lump all these
diﬀerent eﬀects into one privatization variable may be misleading.
We next examine how privatization aﬀects productive and allocative eﬃ-
ciency when we control for the changes in market structure. Here our goal is to
diﬀerentiate the ownership eﬀect of privatization from its eﬀects on the market
structure and the competitive environment. Hence we add two additional con-
trols to our baseline regressions in Table 4; HHI(1) and a deregulation dummy
(dummy86), which is equal to 1 post 1986 and is 0 otherwise. Deregulation
dummy controls for the price deregulation which took place prior to the start
of the privatization reforms. We present these results in Table 7.
The eﬀects of privatization on productive eﬃciency remain virtually un-
changed as shown in Regression 1. Privatization has still a positive and sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on labor productivity. HHI(1) is insigniﬁcant in this regression,
whereas dummy86 is positive and signiﬁcant.6 However, we do observe some
changes in the eﬀects of privatization on allocative eﬃciency when we control for
the market structure. In the price regression (Regression 2), the privatization
eﬀect, while still negative, is no longer signiﬁcant and HHI(1) is positive though
insigniﬁcant. Regression 3 is the same as Regression 2 where our dependent
variable is again log price, but with one diﬀerence; HHI(2) is used as a regressor
6Since price deregulation precedes the start of privatization, we re-estimated the eﬀects
of privatization including three period dummies; the ﬁr s td u m m yi ss e te q u a lt oo n ei ft h e
year is pre-deregulation, a second dummy is set equal to one if it is post-deregulation but
pre-privatization, and a third dummy is set equal to one if it is a post-privatization period for
the ﬁrm. The results of these estimations are consistent with our ﬁndings and available upon
request.
21instead of HHI(1). The results are striking. Privatization is no longer signif-
icant but HHI(2) is positive and signiﬁcant. This indicates the importance of
market concentration in determining price. The more concentrated a market is
the higher the price. The privatization eﬀect remains negative and signiﬁcant
i nt h er e l a t i v ei n ﬂation regression with HHI(1) but loses signiﬁcance if HHI(2)
is used instead.7 Since our panel is short for the price variable we are not able
to include a price deregulation dummy in Regressions 2 and 3.
These results highlight the importance of diﬀerentiating ownership and en-
vironment (market structure) eﬀects of privatization. Controlling for changes
in market structure, we do not ﬁnd that the increase in productive eﬃciency
due to private ownership will beneﬁt consumers in the form of lower prices.
Hence, it is crucial that the market structure ensuing from privatization is care-
fully analyzed as privatization reforms are considered. There is often too much
emphasis on revenue generating and productive eﬃciency improving aspects of
privatization, with little attention paid to allocative eﬃciency.
We admit that our geographical regions are crude measures of the appro-
priate market for each ﬁrm. It is possible that a ﬁrm in one region may sell in
a neighboring region. Since our HHI measures are based on these geographical
regions, one might question whether they are good measures of market concen-
tration. To test the reliability of our HHI measures, we estimate the eﬀects of
HHI(1) on the capacity utilization rate. Here the hypothesis (which is based
on standard models of oligopoly) is that, in more concentrated markets (HHI
high), ﬁr m sh a v em o r em a r k e tp o w e rt oi n ﬂuence price by restricting output and
reducing their capacity utilization rates. Our last regression in Table 7 presents
this regression where the capacity utilization rate is the dependent variable.
We ﬁnd evidence conﬁrming this hypothesis; HHI has a negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on capacity utilization rate, while privatization has a positive but insignif-
7The latter regression is not shown but available upon request.
22icant eﬀect. This ﬁnding strengthens our conﬁdence in our Herﬁndahl Index as
a measure for market concentration/power in the industry.
Robustness Checks
C o n t r o l l i n gf o rt h eB u s i n e s sC y c l e s
Our yearly dummies may not accurately capture the eﬀects of the business
cycle on our ﬁrm performance measures. It would be interesting to see: 1) How
our measures move with the business cycle; and 2) whether the privatization
eﬀect is sensitive to controlling for the changes in the aggregate economy.
Hence, we present our results controlling for an industry production index
which measures the production level in total manufacturing industries (Table
8). In these regressions the dependent variables are our measures of productive
eﬃciency (labor productivity) and allocative eﬃciency (price and the relative
inﬂation rate). We control for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and include year dummies to
control for period eﬀects.
The privatization eﬀect remains positive and signiﬁcant in terms of labor pro-
ductivity and consistent with our earlier results in terms of productive eﬃciency.
Industry production index is positive and signiﬁcant in the labor productivity
regression, which is in line with our expectations. We expect a ﬁrm’s output
to be pro-cyclical. If the increase in a ﬁrm’s labor utilization does not increase
as much as its output, this would result in gains in productivity. The privati-
zation eﬀect remains negative and signiﬁcant in the price and relative inﬂation
rate regressions also consistent with our earlier results on allocative eﬃciency.
Industry production index is negative and signiﬁcant in the price and relative
inﬂation regressions. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of a recent pa-
per on the Turkish economy which shows that price and inﬂation are counter
cyclical and argues that this constitutes a supply-driven model for the Turkish
economy (Alper, 2004).
23A Random Eﬀects Speciﬁcation
One criticism of the privatization process in the cement industry has been
that better performing plants which were located in the west were privatized
ﬁrst while poor performing plants in the east were privatized later (Saygili and
Taymaz, 2001). These authors also point out that, big conglomerates (holding
companies) had a tendency to acquire plants in speciﬁc regions and this caused
the creation of regional monopolies in the cement industry after privatization.
Plants in the eastern regions may also have been privatized last due to the
relative political instability of the region throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
In order to address the concern of unobserved heterogeneity at the regional
level, we model the ﬁrm eﬀects as random and use ﬁrm speciﬁcv a r i a b l e ss u c h
as regional dummies as explanatory variables in our estimation. We construct
regional dummies for the Marmara Region, Aegean Region, Black Sea Region,
Central Anatolia Region, Southeast Anatolia and East Anatolia Region. The
dummy that we leave out in this regression is the dummy for the Marmara Re-
gion and, hence, the coeﬃcients of region dummies are relative to those plants
located in that region of Turkey. In all regressions we control for the privatiza-
tion eﬀect and time dummies in addition to region dummies.
In general the signs and signiﬁc a n c eo ft h ec o e ﬃcients of the privatization
eﬀect are the same as those we found in the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect regressions (Table
9). One exception is the price regression (Regression 3), where the privatization
eﬀect though negative, is no longer signiﬁcant. This is consistent with our ear-
lier results that privatization has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on price once we control
for market structure using a Herﬁndahl Index. Region dummies serve as prox-
ies for the market structure within each region. The coeﬃcients on East and
Southeast Anatolia dummies are negative in the labor productivity regression,
which supports the hypothesis that eastern plants are less productive compared
to their western counterparts.
24Controlling for Diﬀerences in Privatization Years
Privatization years of ﬁrms diﬀer in our sample, as shown in Table 1. One
could argue that, since better performing plants located in the western region
are privatized ﬁrst, our privatization dummy is equal to 1 for these ﬁrms, while
it is equal to 0 for the others for some of the years. Hence, the diﬀerence in
performance between plants privatized earlier and plants privatized later might
produce biased results. Hence we group plants according to their privatization
years and re-estimate our econometric equations separately for each group. For
example, group 1 consists of plants that are privatized in 1989, group 2 is
composed of plants privatized in 1992 and so on.
In general our results for these sub-groups remain consistent with our earlier
results. We ﬁnd that privatization has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor
productivity of plants privatized in 1996 (and mostly located in the eastern re-
gions) as well as for those plants privatized in 1989 (and located in the west)
(not shown but available upon request). We lose signiﬁcance in our results for
the six plants privatized in 1993, 1997 and 1998. For the two plants privatized
in 1997 and 1998, there may not be enough elapsed time in our data to exhibit
improvement in performance. Interestingly, four of these six plants have been
bought by the Rumeli Conglomerate and this group has been recently charged
with criminal activity in their business practices, both by Turkish and US au-
thorities. The Rumeli Cement Group’s management and control was taken over
by Savings Deposit and Insurance Fund of Turkey as of February 2004. This
may highlight the importance of buyer competence in the privatization process
in determining post privatization eﬃciency.
257 Conclusion
In this paper, we ﬁnd support for the Agency View of public ownership presented
in Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Using a longitudinal data set of cement plants
from Turkey, we ﬁnd that the privatized ﬁrms improve productive eﬃciency by
increasing their capital and decreasing their labor endowment.
At a ﬁrst examination, privatization also seems to improve allocative eﬃ-
ciency, as prices fall after privatization. But this eﬀect disappears when we con-
trol for changes in market structure using a measure for market concentration–
the Herﬁndahl Index. Hence, while private ownership has a robust positive ef-
fect on productive eﬃciency, whether gains in productivity will be passed on
to consumers in the form of lower prices will depend on the market structure
ensuing from privatization.
Since we have pre and post privatization data for all the cement plants which
were once public, we are able to avoid the endogeneity problem associated with
sample selection which has been a problem for earlier research. Our results with-
stand various robustness checks addressing other possible problems associated
with sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 1. The privatized cement factories in Turkey 
 
Company  Established in  Privatized in  Buyer 
Afyon 1955  1989  Ciment  Francais 
Ankara 1926  1989  Ciment  Francais 
Balikesir 1958  1989  Ciment  Francais 
Pinarhisar 1958  1989  Ciment  Francais 
Soke 1955  1989  Ciment  Francais 
Corum 1959  1992  Yibitas 
Denizli 1987  1992  Modern 
Gaziantep 1957  1992  Rumeli 
Nigde 1957  1992  OYAK-SABANCI 
Sivas 1943  1992  Yibitas 
Trabzon 1966  1992  Rumeli 
Askale 1968  1993  Ercimsan 
Bartin 1962  1993  Rumeli 
Ladik 1983  1993  Rumeli 
Sanliurfa 1986  1993  Rumeli 
Adiyaman 1983  1995  Teksko 
Elazig 1954  1996  OYAK-GAMA 
Lalapasa 1991  1996  Rumeli 
Kars 1969  1996  Cimentas 
Van 1966  1996  Rumeli 
Ergani 1984  1997  Rumeli 
Kurtalan 1976  1998  Canlar  Otomotiv 
  
Table 2. Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
Capacity  The Minimum Efficient Scale of the firm, measured in tons 
scaled by 1000. 
Capital  Assets measured in Turkish Liras, deflated by the Wholesale 




Capital divided by number of workers 
Herfindahl Index 
(HHI) 
A measure of market concentration, which is calculated by 
summing the squares of firms’ market shares. 
Investment  The Investment Expenditures of the firm, measured in 
Turkish Liras, deflated by the Wholesale Price Index and 
scaled by 1,000,000. 
Labor  The number of workers employed by the firm 
Labor productivity  Per capita cement production, measured in tons 
 
Output  Output sold by the Firm, measured in tons scaled by 1000. 
Prices  The sale price per ton, deflated by Wholesale Price index and 
scaled by 1,000,000 
Relative Inflation 
Rate 
Firm price inflation rate minus wholesale price inflation rate 
Sales   Sales measured in Turkish Liras, deflated by the Price Index 
and scaled by 1,000,000.  
 Table 3. Comparison of Means Three Years Before and After Privatization
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†Data from the three years before and after the year of privatization are included in the before privatization 
and after privatization data sets respectively.  If data was missing for one or two of these years for a given 
firm in the pre (post) privatization period, we also excluded the symmetric year in the post (pre) 
privatization period to ensure that the comparison is symmetric. 
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10% Table 4. Privatization and Efficiency 
Method: Fixed effects estimation (firm level) 
 
  Productive Efficiency  Allocative Efficiency 











































Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 




0.563 0.76  0.696  0.706 
Test Statistic for the 










Number of Observations  266  165  194  329 




Table 5. Privatization and Input Choice 



































Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 




0.741 0.791 0.510 0.090 
Test Statistics 
for the Equality 












266 243 165 260 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10% 
  
Market Concentration Measured By Herfindahl Index (HHI)
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= ∑ where si  is the market share (in percentage) of plant i and n is the number of plants in the 
region.  If two or more plants are owned by the same parent company, then market share of the parent 
company in the region is used for si. 
HHI(1) is the Herfindahl index including the publicly owned firms and HHI(2) excluding the publicly 
owned firms. In calculating HHI(1), share of output sold by publicly owned firms is considered as the share 
of a single firm---the public enterprise. In calculating HHI(2), only output sold by privately owned firms is 











Table 6. Privatization Effects on Market Concentration 


























   
































Dummy97         -540.056 
(-0.73) 
Dummy98         451.837 
(0.61) 
F-statistic 18.57  4.10  116.46  88.99  37740.35 34.44 
 R
2  0.674  0.313  0.9283  0.940 0.998 0.9199 
Number of 
Observations 
21  21  21 21 21 21 










 Table 7. Privatization Effects Controlling for Market Structure 
Method: Fixed effects estimation (firm level) 
 
  Productive 
Efficiency 
Allocative Efficiency   




































































Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 




0.56 0.69  0.69  0.71  0.04 
Test Statistic for the 














266 194  193  329  266 
†HHI(1) is used in all regressions except for regression 3 where HHI(2) is used.  
t-statistics are in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10% 
 
 Robustness Checks 
Table 8. Privatization Effects Controlling for the Business Cycle 
Method: Fixed effects estimation (firm level) 

























Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F Statistic  103.94  46.71  41.76 
R
2 0.563  0.696  0.701 









Number of Observations  266  194  329 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10% 
 
 
Table 9. Privatization and Efficiency 
Method: Random effects estimation (firm level) 






















































Wald Statistic  1649.76  580.57  753.95 
Overall R
2 0.70  0.734  0.711 
Number of Observations  266  194  329 
z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10% 
 